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Sophisticated cyber threats represent a significant adversary in the evolving 
world of the cyber domain. Furthermore, determining whether or not an attack 
has taken place and the extent of the damage caused requires significant 
resources. In order to guarantee reliable detection, prevention and mitigation of 
these advanced threats, the Department of Defense (DoD) must invest in 
advanced information security technologies that increase the defensive 
capabilities of its information networks. 
This thesis focuses on Security Information and Event Management 
(SIEM) systems as an enabling technology that possesses the advanced security 
capabilities required to address sophisticated, evolving cyber threats. The 
research explores the capabilities of this technology in terms of the speed of 
detection, depth of investigative power, and additional value provided. 
Additionally, this research attempts to quantify the return on investment that a 
SIEM solution could provide when deployed in a notional DoD network 
architecture. Ultimately, the research provided in this thesis endeavors to justify 
DoD investment in SIEM technology. 
The focus of this research revolves around a qualitative description of the 
inherent capabilities of SIEM products and utilizes several Return on Security 
Investment models in an attempt to quantitatively define the value of these 
capabilities in a DoD network.   
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Emerging cyber threats indicate a significant obstacle to Department of 
Defense (DoD) assets and operations worldwide. Contemporary information 
assurance strategy promotes a defense-in-depth paradigm, where network 
security devices exist in layers to counter specific threats or monitor specific 
activity. Further, financial justification for these investments hinges upon the 
notion of security as a cost of doing business. However, in an era of limited 
budgetary consideration for computer network defense investments, funding a 
new implementation of a security investment requires not only a dynamic range 
of prevention and incident response capabilities, but must also provide an 
acceptable return on investment (RoI).   
In the DoD, this presents a unique situation that juggles capability 
enhancement versus the sunk cost of a security investment. After all, an 
investment in security represents a sunk cost because it does not generate 
revenue for the organization (Stephenson, 2012). But, justification of an 
investment in security resides in the avoidance of potential costs that the 
capability aims to mitigate or minimize. 
A Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) implementation 
offers the ability to leverage the current defense-in-depth- strategy employed 
throughout the DoD while also offering increased defensive capabilities to further 
secure DoD networks and information systems. Furthermore, an investment in 
SIEM technology exhibits the potential for a significant return on security 
investment (RoSI) because of the enhanced capabilities offered inherently within 
the technology as well as the ability to correlate data from disparate network and 
network security devices, thereby increasing their effectiveness. Essentially, 
SIEM closes the gaps between the layers of a defense-in-depth security 
architecture and combines disparate security devices into a nimble, cohesive 
defense.  
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Despite the potential that SIEM technology represents to increase DoD 
network security, agility and efficiency, investment in the technology still requires 
quantifiable justification. However, as the typical measurement used to justify 
investments fails to apply to both the DoD as an organization as well as the 
security realm, exploring alternative measurements of calculating return require 
thoughtful consideration. Furthermore, an examination of several Return on 
Security (RoS) or Return on Security Investment (RoSI) methods offers insight 
into justification of an SIEM solution as well as a basis for considering future 
security investment options. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Modern information systems face significant and sophisticated threats on 
a persistent basis. Traditional methods of thwarting cyber threats involve the 
application of perimeter security devices as well security solutions designed to 
mitigate specific threats. While altogether effective, this method leaves significant 
gaps in the ability to detect or prevent exploitation. Furthermore, most attacks go 
unnoticed for large amounts of time or until significant damage has already 
occurred. In order to effectively mitigate modern cyber security threats, 
organizations must consolidate security efforts into a single cohesive effort. 
B. PURPOSE AND THESIS STATEMENT 
The purpose of this study is to understand the value a SIEM solution can 
provide, both economically and operationally within a nominal DoD environment. 
Effectively, how can a SIEM application enhance network security and mitigate 
the risk of advanced cyber threats?  Secondly, what potential return on 
investment could a SIEM application implemented on a DoD network provide?  
 On the surface, SIEM applications improve network security by integrating 
isolated network security devices via the aggregation and correlation of their 
associated log data, effectively forcing a potential attacker to attempt to bypass 
all security devices at once rather than individually. Despite this remarkable 
benefit, the value of a SIEM solution in a DoD environment must not only provide 
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increased capability, but also remain economically justifiable. This study will 
utilize various methods to determine the economic value of a SIEM solution, 
while also qualitatively determining the additional value provided by the system in 
the form of capability enhancement and increased knowledge of the host 
information system. Ultimately, this thesis will attempt to answer the questions a 
SIEM application enhance network security and mitigate the risk of advanced 
cyber security threats? 
C. BACKGROUND 
1. Threats Facing the Nation 
Growing interconnectivity and information sharing capability brought about 
by networked information systems has changed the way that Americans 
communicate, conduct business and even view the world around them. However, 
increased reliance on information systems also represents one of the largest 
threats to the nation, primarily due to the evolution of advanced security threats. 
The sophistication and proliferation of cyber security threats throughout the world 
demand increased vigilance to innovate new methods to detect and mitigate 
them before they cause harm. 
Federal agencies are not immune from these threats, but the detective 
and preventative capabilities across the nation are significantly lacking. For 
example, in 2012, 92% of security breaches were not detected by the affected 
organization and required a third party to determine that a breach had in fact 
taken place (Honan, 2012). Furthermore, most of those breaches were avoidable 
because the attacks themselves were not highly difficult to accomplish (Honan, 
2012). However, the most staggering statistic of all from the data collected in 
2012 is the fact that 85% of these breaches took at least one week to discover 
(Honan, 2012). Applying these statistics to the understanding that in 2011 federal 
agencies reported a total of 42,887 security incidents creates even more 
uncertainty surrounding the effectiveness of current network security measures 
(Wilshusen, 2012) 
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Federal systems are not sufficiently protected to consistently detect or 
mitigate advanced cyber security threats (Wilshusen, 2010). Effectively intrusion 
detection and prevention requires advanced capabilities not found within the 
current federal information security architecture. It is only through investment in 
enabling technologies like SIEM solutions that federal agencies have any hope of 
mitigating advanced cyber threats. This is of particular concern given the recent 
observation of malicious software affecting physical damage in the real world 
(Constantine, 2011). Malicious software and enterprising hackers can do more 
than just steal information, disrupt operating systems or evade perimeter security 
devices, and advanced security tools must increase their detective and 
preventative capabilities in kind.   
2. DoD/National Cyberspace Strategy 
The DoD maintains that cyber space is a critical war-fighting domain that 
requires continued attention to provide security to U.S. interest and maintain 
continuity of operations. The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace explicitly 
defines advanced network security as a critical requirement, emphasizing the 
requirements to “prevent cyber attacks against America’s critical infrastructure, 
reduce national vulnerability to cyber attacks and minimize damage and recovery 
time from cyber attacks that do occur” (Office of the President of the United 
States, 2003). In order to accomplish these requirements the nation must 
develop advanced cyber security intelligence that offers enhanced trend analysis 
related to evolving threats and vulnerabilities (Office of the President of the 
United States, 2003). Furthermore, as defined in the DoD IT Enterprise Strategy 
and Roadmap, these capabilities will enable the DoD to bolster its predictive and 
preventative capabilities, reducing the risk of successful attacks on data and 
networks (Officer of the Secretary of Defense, 2011). 
Application of a SIEM solution also advances the special IT initiatives 
defined in the DoD IT Enterprise Strategy and Roadmap in several ways. 
Primarily, the SIEM application will drastically improve the cyber security situation 
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awareness across the department. However, as existing network security 
architecture focuses primarily on securing the perimeter of the DoD network, 
phased replacement of these systems would allow for a SIEM implementation in 
concert with a system refresh, advancing the capability to combat emerging 
threats and advance perimeter and enterprise wide security initiatives.   
Additionally, the DoD endeavors to cultivate capabilities inherent in SIEM 
applications, as defined in the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. SIEM 
solutions offer the DoD the ability to leverage automated tools and continual 
assessments against perimeter security efforts as well as internal monitoring and 
information management, which are in line with the DoD strategic initiatives 
(United States Department of Defense, 2011). Furthermore, employment of a 
SIEM represents a movement toward active cyber defense capabilities to 
discover, detect, analyze and mitigate threats in real-time (United States 
Department of Defense, 2011).  
3. DoD Budget 
Despite an austere fiscal horizon, securing defense information networks 
from intrusion is one of the critical areas highlighted for investment in the coming 
fiscal years (United States Department of Defense, 2013). As a national priority, 
continued investment in advanced network security requires not only innovation, 
but also strategic investment in capabilities that complement and support existing 
security investments. By leveraging the information provided by existing IT 
security investments throughout the DoD, a SIEM solution represents a security 
investment that not only enhances capability but also preserves and increases 
the value of the existing network security endeavors. 
4. Benefits of the Study 
The potential benefit of this thesis study includes economic justification of 
a security technology investment as well as an increased understanding of the 
inherent value provided by a SIEM solution. In addition to the financial incentive 
determined through this thesis study by determining the potential RoI of a SIEM 
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solution, this thesis will also describe operational benefits achieved through SIEM 
solutions such as increased network efficiency, enhanced compliance 
enforcement, threat detection and prevention, and an overall increase in real-
time knowledge of the information system. 
5. Security Information and Event Management 
The forerunners of the technology that became Security Information and 
Event Management (SIEM) systems first arrived on the market in the early 1990s 
(Chuvakin, 2010). Effectively, SIEM solutions represent a combination of 
advanced log management systems and security event detection and 
notification. When combined, both of these technologies, known separately as 
Security Information Management (SIM) and Security Event Management, 
respectively, offer the ability to actively detect and investigate potential security 
threats in near real-time. In order to effectively accomplish this, the knowledge 
that each device creates about a network through extensive log files is combined 
into a single cohesive picture of the information system, allowing managers to 
distill threat patterns from disparate events from the aggregated, correlated data.   
Originally, the premise of SIEM applications was explored in interest in 
order to reduce the number of false positives encountered by Intrusion Detection 
Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) (Chuvakin, 2010). 
However, as log file management systems achieved greater capability and 
efficiency, these applications developed into more of a security management 
solution, increasing the detective and preventative capability of any security 
architecture by combining their individual efforts into a single cohesive force. 
Fundamentally, the application of a SIEM solution to a network provides 
absolutely no additional security (Dorigo, 2012, 2012). The stimulus for installing 
a SIEM solution comes from the added knowledge of the network and systems 
connected to it that the SIEM inherently provides. This knowledge can be used to 
effectively identify threats, provide compliance reporting, assist in forensic or 
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diagnostic investigation as well as offer a number of other advanced security 
operations. 
6. Methodology 
Initial research methods will primarily involve secondary research focused 
on SIEM technology and valuation of information security investments. These 
efforts will include case studies of SIEM solutions, descriptions of the capabilities 
provided by SIEM technology, and a comparative analysis of existing methods of 
determining the return on security investment. 
Additional research to expand the subject as it relates to DoD network 
security will attempt to justify the investment in a SIEM solution by examining the 
results of an investment model applied to the implementation of a SIEM solution 
in a notional DoD network.  
7. Thesis Structure 
This thesis is organized into the following chapters. 
Chapter I provides an introduction and overview of this thesis. 
Chapter II gives a synopsis of SIEM solutions. This chapter provides a 
basic overview of the definition of SIEM, its background and components as 
defined by the current market state of the technology. 
Chapter III describes methods of estimating return on a security 
investment. This chapter provides detailed descriptions on the various 
developing models of valuing investment in a particular security technology.   
Chapter IV describes the application of a Return on Security Investment 
(ROSI) model to a SIEM solution in a DoD environment. This chapter describes 
the potential return on investment that a SIEM solution could provide when 
implemented in an environment similar to most DoD network environments, as 
well as the potential added benefits that the system provides. 
Chapter V concludes this thesis. 
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II. SECURITY INFORMATION AND EVENT MANAGEMENT  
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Traditional Information Technology Security 
Current methods of enterprise information technology (IT) security revolve 
around the application of point defense systems in a defense-in-depth strategy. 
While this strategy stands the test of time, as nation states have known for 
centuries that point security measures, such as border controls and passports, 
have a quantifiable effect on the overall security of the nation, it remains 
inherently flawed (Tarzey & Longbottom, 2012). Point defenses fundamentally 
mitigate a single vulnerability, or a single type of vulnerability. However, in a 
world of evolving advanced cyber threats, appliance security systems fail to 
address the overall risk of attack and leave systems vulnerable. Effectively, 
leaving disparate security devices in isolation removes the ability to leverage the 
information they produce, and reduces their overall effectiveness at combatting 
the risk they were intended to mitigate. 
The most troubling aspect of the traditional IT security practices remains 
the fact that the application of point security products provides no collective 
mitigation of risk. Essentially, the whole is lesser than the sum of the parts. For 
example, an intrusion detection system (IDS) or intrusion prevention system 
(IPS) may prevent multiple failed attempts to access a resource, but may miss 
the single successful penetration from the same source (Tarzey & Longbottom, 
2012thm). Or, a virus scanner may protect a system from multiple attacks by 
malicious code, but may not detect a zero-day exploit. The result of traditional IT 
security strategy is that every security incident that is detected is addressed in 
isolation from the perspective of the intended security product based on its 
“inherently limited knowledge of its relation to other security incidents” (Tripwire, 
2012). The application of a defense-in-depth strategy through point security 
devices effectively creates a scenario where an intruder can attack an 
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information system by learning how to evade each individual protection, having 
learned how to penetrate the preceding device (Swift, 2006). The downfall of 
each security product lies in its isolation from other security products. An intruder 
need only have the patience to develop a method to bypass each individual 
device and the entire security strategy crumbles. 
Historically, application of IT security boils down to a singular factor, cost. 
In effect, security is about “managing risk at some cost” (RSA, 2010). Often, the 
most cost effective method of managing IT security risks is with the application of 
point security products aimed at mitigating specific threats (Tarzey & 
Longbottom, 2012thm). The amount of cost incurred to apply these point security 
products relates directly to the inherent value of the assets at risk. Furthermore, 
the current approach to costing these products is based on the deliverables 
provided at each point device. Effectively, the cost of managing the risk of cyber 
threat equates to the “number of scanners or monitors in use” and the value 
provided by the “amount of time they spend scanning or monitoring” (Tripwire, 
2012). 
This trend of managing IT security risk through application of point devices 
stifles the strategic potential of enterprise IT security. Further, failing to recognize 
the strategic importance of enterprise security relegates the application of it to a 
“jumble of silos – among them [Information Assurance Management], application 
security, endpoint protection, network security and data security” (Tripwire, 
2012). The popularity of point security systems also suppresses the shift toward 
enterprise IT security because of the simplicity of these devices. The effort 
involved in the installation and management of point security products is almost 
negligible (Chuvakin, 2004). For example, the installation of a lock in the front 
door of a home provides a measure of security against intruders and is simple to 
install and manage. However, this point security device thwarts the risk of an 
intrusion only enough to force an intruder to discover another method of entry 
into the home. In order to effectively minimize the risk of advanced cyber threats, 
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organizations must recognize that protection entails moving beyond traditional 
point security products (Tarzey & Longbottom, 2012).   
A more comprehensive approach to enterprise IT security must assert 
itself over the more traditional, disjointed methods. Vulnerabilities can no longer 
be considered in isolation. One cannot count of the individual devices to confer 
with one another on the significance of a group of events from disparate systems, 
nor can one rely on the ability of a security analyst to recognize the significance 
of individual events across security platforms (Hutton, 2007). In order to 
effectively mitigate the existing risk of exploitation that each point security device 
is intended to thwart, all of these assets must be aggregated and correlated 
across the entire enterprise network (Stephenson, 2012). Effectively, the 
integration of each point security device into a comprehensive approach enables 
advanced security intelligence, “improved analytics and optimal decision-making” 
(Tripwire, 2012). 
2. Advanced Threats 
Modern cyber security threats represent sophisticated, committed forces 
that are proven effective against existing security point defenses. In fact, there 
are many existing threat that have recently emerged “that can only be detected 
by correlating information from a wide range of sources, including point security 
products themselves” (Tarzey & Longbottom, 2012). Furthermore, if an attack 
represents an aspect of a broader campaign than the application of 
countermeasures may exceed the realm of enterprise IT security. However, in 
order to effectively combat these campaigns, application of countermeasures 
beyond the scope of IT security still may require information collected and 
correlated by IT security products (Tarzey & Longbottom, 2012). Effectively, 
combatting advanced cyber security threats requires more consideration than 
simply a tactical application of point security devices. Combatting modern, 
advanced cyber threats requires an integrated approach to security that 
leverages strategy rather than tactical proficiency. 
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3. Alternate SIEM Adoption Trends 
Implementation of SIEM systems represents a trend toward solving a 
number of enterprise IT problems. Traditional SIEM, combined with log 
management technology, has the potential to deliver a multitude of functionality 
to the enterprise, from security incident response to regulatory compliance, 
system management and application troubleshooting (Chuvakin, 2010). Overall, 
the application of SIEM delivers advanced knowledge about the IT landscape 
that can deliver results in a number of different ways.  
Log management functionality inherent in SIEM applications is another 
driving force in the adoption of SIEM systems. Every device, application and 
interface generates log data. SIEM applications allow organizations to efficiently 
manage these logs, offering not only collection solutions but also the ability to 
conduct comprehensive review of these logs lending immense knowledge of the 
IT environment to network managers. Furthermore, effective log management in 
SIEM applications streamlines the entire process, allowing organizations to easily 
and routinely collect, store and review logs at any point, not just after an incident 
(Chuvakin, 2010).   
In addition to security applications, one of the primary drivers of SIEM 
application adoption is the capability that the technology lends to meet external 
compliance goals. There are multiple legal requirements imposed upon 
organizations that require effective management of log files. In fact, meeting 
regulatory compliance requirements is the main reason for 80% of all SIEM 
projects (Karlzen, 2009). Nearly every organization operating an information 
system on a network must meet baseline requirements for log file management, 
according to several legislative articles. The Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standard (PCI DSS) mandates specific logging details including log 
retention and daily log review (PCI DSS). The Health Information Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) requires log management for securing 
electronic protected health information (HIPAA). Additionally, the Federal 
Information Security Management Act of 2002 (FISMA) requires log management 
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in order to maintain successful and efficient log management infrastructures, to 
include generation, analysis, storage and monitoring (44 U.S.C. CHAPTER 35, 
2002). A SIEM implementation underpins the effort to achieve any internal or 
external regulatory compliance goal. 
From a security standpoint, organizations adopt SIEM technology in order 
to develop a comprehensive knowledge base of the entire IT security 
architecture. One of the biggest obstacles that organizations faced was that they 
could not objectively discern whether or not an attack had taken place without 
significant effort. Adding a SIEM security implementation helps to mitigate this by 
reducing “the number of security events on any given day to a manageable, 
actionable list and to automate analysis such that real attacks and intruders can 
be discerned” (Swift, 2006). Further confusing the issue, different devices might 
report the same event on the network in a different way, increasing both the 
number and complexity of security events and leaving no way to discern the truth 
of their relationship (Chuvakin, 2004). Automating the correlation of disparate 
security events significantly alleviates the strain on security engineers, whom, no 
matter how skilled, are generally only able to respond to about 1,000 events per 
day (Swift, 2006). Furthermore, security applications of SIEM systems also 
leverage the potential of disparate security devices where, if events are not 
monitored and correlated, the “total security capabilities of a system will not 
exceed its weakest link” (Swift, 2006). Application of an SIEM system aids in 
integrating traditional network management and effectively increases the 
capability of detecting and responding to network security threats. 
Furthermore, SIEM adoption trends by organizations represent a shift in 
the fundamental understanding of enterprise IT security. A recent RSA study 
noted that more than 75 % of mid-size organizations ranked real-time security 
monitoring as essential to their operations, and 90 % of the total respondents 
implemented SIEM solutions citing security operations as the primary purpose 
(RSA, 2010). SIEM represents the next step in advanced network security 
through its aggregation and correlation functionality as well, lending capability to 
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organizations through intelligent security systems. Effectively, the move away 
from scanning and monitoring unrelated security silos toward a more integrated 
approach represents the growing push toward enterprise security intelligence 
(Tripwire, 2012).  
The strength of SIEM as a security application resides in the aggregation 
and correlation engine of the system. Before SIEM, terabytes of log data were 
available but unused (Sc eBook, 2010). By processing and correlating the 
immense amount of data produced by network devices, SIEM applications 
display the suspicious activity that humans simply could not discover and 
effectively aids in mitigating cyber threats that otherwise would have gone 
unnoticed (Tarzey & Longbottom, 2012). It was the lack of advanced security 
intelligence that lead to the tactical method of deploying point security devices, 
which can help secure networks. But, the capability to aggregate and correlate 
data offers organizations the ability to recognize that a device is being used in an 
unusual way in the context of the broader network (Tarzey & Longbottom, 2012). 
This capability is the cornerstone of SIEM adoption trends, taking existing 
intelligence and correlating it with other sources of information in order to foster 
good decision-making. Integration and correlation expands the breadth of 
security detection and protection, delivering improved security and advanced 
business value (Tripwire, 2012).  
B. DEFINITION 
1. Log Management 
Log file management systems provide access to a source of information 
that lies unused in many network management solutions. Every device, 
application or system connected to a network produces log files containing 
information on the network connection or logging interaction between devices 
(Chuvakin, 2004). Security devices are particularly guilty of added to the ocean of 
information accumulated in log files (Hutton, 2007). However, the log files by 
themselves are irrelevant. Any program can scan log files, from the simplest 
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script to high-end applications (Dorigo, 2012). Effective log management includes 
comprehensive log collection, aggregation, retention, analysis and presentation 
(Chuvakin, 2010). Essentially, these defining features of a log file management 
system enable it to collect gigabytes and even terabytes of log data efficiently 
and deliver provisions to store it effectively and conveniently. This is not a trivial 
task as effective log file management is the first step toward a full SIEM 
environment (Dorigo, 2012). Without the ability to store and access these huge 
amounts of data effectively provided by log file management systems, SIEM 
capabilities would not exist. 
2. Security Information Management and Security Event 
Management 
SIM and SEM systems are the precursors for modern SIEM applications. 
SIM systems represent the log file management aspect of the SIEM architecture 
while SEM systems evolved out of network anomaly detection and notification 
systems. SIM focuses on analysis and reporting of log data and efficient storage 
with provisions for long-term storage and maintaining accessibility (Dorigo, 
2012). Similarly, proper deployment of SEM tools also leads to a dramatic 
increase in the ability to effectively identify an incident in progress through real-
time monitoring and notifications. However, the combination of these two 
systems together leveraged the power of log file analysis with anomaly detection, 
providing definitive data on real-time security events through integration and 
correlation. Essentially, it is the “events that trigger alerts, but it’s the information 
that gets the analysis done” (Stephenson, 2012). 
3. Security Information and Event Management 
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) represents the 
combination of several research fields, including statistics, data mining, data 
warehousing, distributed data, machine learning and intelligent systems (Dorigo, 
2012). Effectively, the combination of Security Information Management (SIM) 
and Security Event Management (SEM) consolidated the benefits of log file 
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correlation through log management systems in addition to leveraging anomaly 
detection into a single application. The technology to do this has existed since 
the late 1990s and was pioneered in order to develop a “security single pane of 
glass” (Chuvakin, 2010). 
SIEM tools evolved out of the IDS and IPS disciplines. Early SIEM tools 
were developed in order to collect data from security devices in order to search 
for patterns indicative of threats (Sc eBook, 2010). Primarily, their original use in 
the IDS/IPS environment was to reduce false positives, which plagued network 
IDS/IPS systems at the time (Chuvakin, 2010). However, through their ability to 
effectively administer the data provided by security devices, they evolved into 
more of a security management tool.   
The primary functionality of SIEM systems is to provide real-time analysis 
of security events captured by network devices (Aguirre & Alonso, 2012). These 
devices can be hardware or software, but the emphasis remains on the swift 
collection and correlation of data across these products in order to facilitate real-
time monitoring and incident management (Gartner, 2011). An effective SIEM 
system combines the functionality of a centralized log file management system 
and analysis of these logs in real-time into an integrated product.  
Done well, an SIEM application produces undeniable benefits. However, 
the most unique factor of SIEM applications is that they are not inherently 
security applications. Applying a SIEM solution to a network will not make a 
network more secure (Dorigo, 2012). However, when implemented properly, like 
an IDS system, a SIEM system can prove extremely effective at alerting 
anomalies and identifying threats, and other advanced security operations 
(Honan, 2012). While operational efficiency and effectiveness and log 
management are the goals of a SIEM implementation, the primary benefit of a 
SIEM product is the knowledge of the IT landscape of an organization that it 
creates (Dorigo, 2012).   
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4. Fundamental Aspects of SIEM 
At the core of the functionality of SIEM products lies the ability to take lots 
of data from lots of different sources and distill “useful, actionable information 
from it” (Stephenson, 2012). For that reason, no SIEM tool can exist in isolation. 
In order to achieve the full functionality desired of an SIEM it must be able to 
interact with as many devices as possible on the network. Fundamentally, the 
primary functions of SIEM include log consolidation, threat correlation, incident 
management and reporting (Swift, 2006). In fact, the ability to correlate data is 
the defining feature of a SIEM tool, but it cannot be accomplished without 
aggregation of large amounts of data from many sources and continuous 
monitoring of events (Aguirre & Alonso, 2012). Effectively, the central aspect of a 
SIEM implementation is the ability to combine existing network resources into a 
“cohesive synergistic defense” (Swift, 2006).   
C. SYSTEM FUNCTIONALITY 
1. Collection 
In order to provide the SIEM engine with data, it first has to be collected 
from the various devices in the IT landscape. Without information from devices 
on the network, the SIEM is effectively useless. Information is necessary to 
interpret the events and create knowledge about the network environment. 
Different SIEM implementations have different methods of employing software or 
hardware in the IT landscape in order to gather the required information. 
In order to collect the data across the enterprise network, most SIEM 
systems utilize one of two particular methods involving agents. An agent is a 
particularly piece of programming provided by the SIEM vendor that is capable of 
forwarding log entries from a host to an SIEM collector over a secure connection 
(Dorigo, 2012). In the first collection method, an agent is installed on various 
devices like routers or firewalls throughout the network. These agents capture 
events processed by the devices on which they are installed and forward them to 
an intermediate device called collectors for normalization and aggregation. The 
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other method involves agentless collection where the “device is capable of 
sending the log entries to a collector themselves, thus mitigating the need for an 
agent to be installed” (Dorigo, 2012). Agentless collection has its advantages 
over collection through an installed agent because the device can run smoothly 
without interruption and without changes to its system (Dorigo, 2012). In order for 
a device with an installed agent to transmit the collected data to a collector it 
must intermittently disrupt the operation of the device upon which it is installed, 
which can have negative effects on the availability of network resources. 
However, the disadvantages of agentless collection are the facts that devices the 
lack encryption or compression methods and that the log file must be saved on 
the host system prior to transfer, which leaves information open to manipulation 
before arriving to the collector and uses finite resources on the host (Dorigo, 
2012). Specific methods of collection usually vary depending on the sensitivity of 
the environment utilizing the SIEM system. 
Collectors are the first step that data takes from the agents on the network 
toward the centralized SIEM system. They serve as an intermediate between 
potentially hundreds or thousands of agents around the network and the core of 
the SIEM application (Dorigo, 2012). Depending on the implementation, they can 
correlate some data, but their main purpose is to normalize the collected data 
from the various agents in order to forward more structured, hierarchal log data 
toward the core SIEM application (Dorigo, 2012). In addition to log data, 
collectors also gather contextual data on the environment in which the data was 
collected. This information can include network traffic statistics or user identity 
information as well as vulnerability assessment results (Chuvakin, 2010). 
Effectively, collectors accomplish the enormously difficult task of gathering data 
from every agent on the network, turning it all into something that can be read by 
the core SIEM application, and forwarding it on to the correlation engine. 
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2. Normalization 
One of the primary obstacles that SIEM systems face before data arrives 
at the core SIEM application is the fact that each device on the network keeps 
logs in different formats. A Cisco router keeps logs according to a different 
schema than a Linux server and a workstation running Windows. Correlating the 
data contained within the logs of these three devices can be accomplished 
without normalizing the log file to a common schema, but that process becomes 
impossible once the system attempts to correlate the log files of hundreds or 
thousands of devices throughout the enterprise.   
Because these file formats are often so different, before the log files 
collected can be “intelligently categorized, it should be normalized to a common 
schema” (Chuvakin, 2004). This formatted log data, now in either a universal or 
proprietary format depending on the vendor, is then forwarded to the core SIEM 
application. 
3. Correlation 
The ability to correlate data across disparate network devices is the 
primary benefit of SIEM systems. Relating different events and contextual data to 
each other helps sift through immense amounts of diverse data and identify 
problems, threats or potential attacks. From a security perspective, event 
correlation refers to the process of threat identification by “looking at not only 
individual events, but also at their sets, bound by some common parameter” 
(Chuvakin, 2004). For example, an event detected on a firewall may not be 
suspicious by itself, but when it can be associated with an escalation of user 
privilege or an upload of unknown software it then merits further investigation 
(Honan, 2012). However, without the ability to correlate log data like this than the 
pattern of events disappears in the ether of hundreds of thousands of network 
events.   
SIEM correlation uses two loosely categorized methods in order to sift 
through the large amounts of data provided to the application that highlights the 
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realistic anomalies occurring on the network while at the same time reducing 
false positives. The first method, rule-based correlation, follows a similar 
methodology to signature based virus detection (Chuvakin, 2004). The second 
method employs the knowledge derived from normal network activity 
accumulated over time and then applies statistical correlation methods to this 
baseline (Chuvakin, 2004). Furthermore, both of these methods apply to data 
collected between events and known vulnerabilities, between events and 
characteristics of the host network and between events from different hosts on 
the network (Dorigo, 2012). All of these methods applied from each of these 
perspectives enable the correlation engine of SIEM applications to distill 
actionable information from hundreds of thousands of seemingly random events. 
Rule-based correlation follows a pattern defined by existing knowledge of 
an attack (Chuvakin, 2004). The correlation engine determines then determines 
the severity of the threat based explicitly on what is detected in precise terms. 
Essentially, a series of in-then statements exists within the SIEM application 
delineating an exact scenario that an attack must follow in order to be detected 
as a high-severity threat (Chuvakin, 2004). The strength of rule-based correlation 
lies in the ability to uncover hidden threats or exploitations that are impossible to 
uncover otherwise, like the typical slow play attack employed by hackers over 
long periods of time. 
Statistical correlation utilizes numerical algorithms to detect deviations 
from normal event levels and other routine activities (Chuvakin, 2004). Detecting 
threats through statistical analysis first requires careful base lining of network 
activity and the establishment of event thresholds (Chuvakin, 2004). Careful 
institution of these thresholds can help mitigate false positives, but depending on 
the tolerance of these thresholds it can also assist in detecting low volume 
threats. Although easy and logical to implement, the implementation of statistical 
correlation algorithms requires time to trend normal network and host activities, in 
addition to acceptance of these events as normal activity (Chuvakin, 2004). 
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Both methods of correlation have inherent challenges both in 
implementation and in their ability to detect patterns effectively. However, the 
combination of both of these methods effectively mitigates the shortcomings of 
them both, leading to coherent correlation and quality threat identification 
(Chuvakin, 2004). Additionally, effective correlation of collected log data allows 
security managers to uncover unforeseen attacks and thwart them in progress, 
should the data be provided to the core SIEM application quickly enough (Tarzey 
& Longbottom, 2012thm). But, regardless of the collection speed, these 
correlation methods can be applied to incoming events or historical data as 
necessary to determine the existence of a threat (Chuvakin, 2004). When done 
effectively, correlation of log data offers the promise of dramatically reduced 
response times for routine attacks, automation of threats detected through rules 
and statistics, identification of suspicious and malicious activities on the network 
and increased awareness of the network (Chuvakin, 2004). 
4. Notification 
The most useful feature of SIEM application is its ability to notify 
managers of what it detects. Reporting on the events that SIEM application 
observes takes several forms, depending on the threat classification of the 
correlated events. The initial intent behind SIEM applications was to provide 
managers with a “single pane of glass” view of their network (Chuvakin, 2004). 
Accurate, timely reporting from SIEM applications allows manager to effectively 
view network activity in real or near real-time. Additionally, depending on the 
severity of the detected threat, the SIEM application can notify management and 
security response teams via e-mail, SMS messaging, or even enact automatic 
security controls to mitigate the threat. These measures not only add value to the 
network, but also significantly increase the knowledge of the organization 
regarding the tools and services available on their information systems. 
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D. USE CASES 
1. Models of SIEM Applications 
Implementation of SIEM application usually follows several main themes, 
depending on the desires of the organization upon installation of the system. 
Security implementations, often referred to as threat management, focus on 
“detecting and responding to attacks, malware infection, data theft and other 
security issues” (Chuvakin, 2004). This particular implementation focuses on 
SIEM systems detective and investigative ability in order to achieve heightened 
security awareness and responsiveness. Another use case of SIEM 
implementations involves the desire of the organization to achieve regulatory 
compliance more effectively. This focuses on satisfying local policies as well as 
satisfying various laws and mandates (Chuvakin, 2004). Finally, organizations 
implement SIEM systems in order to advance their understanding of their 
information systems and networks. From this operations standpoint, 
organizations gain actionable knowledge of their networks in real-time (Chuvakin, 
2004). Variations of these implementation themes exist, and organizations often 
install a SIEM application with the intent to achieve one, but eventually, often 
unintentionally, exhibit characteristics of all three examples. 
2. Threat Management 
Security implementations of SIEM systems allow for effective threat 
management across the enterprise. Collection and correlation of log files via a 
SIEM application reveals the vital signs of a network, providing a solid base for 
incident management and threat response (Dorigo, 2012). The realization that 
“the number of attacks against a network is never zero, nor is the number of 
suspicious transactions over the network,” when compared against these 
observed vital signs allows SIEM applications to draw attack vectors and boost 
incident management capabilities of the organization (Dorigo, 2012). This is 
insight that cannot be derived from point security tools alone, and SIEM 
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applications can report on all of them effectively and in a timely manner in 
addition to reducing the impact of security incidents. 
Another motivator of SIEM security applications is the ability to shield 
organizations from some of the most elusive and complex modern threats. For 
example, SIEM has the ability to counter insider threats because of the increased 
monitoring capability and improved identity and access management that the 
system provides (Karlzen, 2009). Effectively, every user from super administrator 
to guest access can be monitored swiftly and accurately with automated security 
controls preventing any unauthorized access or data leakage. Furthermore, 
SIEM systems have the innate ability to identify weak spots in a network security 
architecture, allowing security engineers to shore up defenses before they are 
exploited in real-time. 
3. Compliance 
SIEM implementations, thanks to their superb log reporting and 
management capabilities have become synonymous with compliance 
management systems (RSA, 2010). Effectively, SIEM systems can be configured 
to automatically enforce current policies and regulations as well as provide 
extensive log management solutions. Deviation from policy by any user or any 
device can be detected, correlated and corrected almost instantaneously and, 
more importantly, cost effectively.   
For example, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
published special publication 800–53, specifying the security and privacy controls 
for federal information systems and organizations (NIST, 2013). A SIEM 
application offers the ability to automatically determine compliance with these 





The operational advantage and insight that SIEM implementations offer to 
organizations cannot be understated. SIEM systems provide automation of 
routine services, reducing the need for staff to conduct time-consuming and 
expensive data analysis (Tarzey & Longbottom, 2012). Additionally, SIEM 
applications boost confidence in IT systems, which allows organizations to 
effectively leverage the business value that IT systems provide. The confidence 
increase comes from the increased system protection that improves system 
availability, a more capable IT staff that is no longer burdened under the weight 
of thousands of potentially threatening events, and readily available information 
on network health and operations (Tarzey & Longbottom, 2012). However, the 
ultimate value that a well-deployed SIEM application provides is the improved 
business continuity and minimal operation and financial impact on services 
(Butler, 2009). SIEM applications provide the transparency required for seamless 
network operations in support of the organization while at the same time offer 
increased capability in protecting and monitoring these assets as well. 
E. CONSIDERATIONS 
1. Implementation 
One of the pitfalls of implementing SIEM systems is the consideration that 
an SIEM system may not be the most practical solution to the problems found 
within an enterprise network. For example, in order for a SIEM application to 
function effectively, an organization must have established risk management 
objective, security policies and compliance requirements in order to achieve the 
most return on the investment (RSA, 2010). Otherwise the system will gather and 
correlate log data with no intended purpose, other than security management, 
and then the full value of the system never becomes realized. Another problem 
arises from the network configuration of the organization’s network (Sc eBook, 
2010). Just like other network devices, SIEM applications require tuning and 
adjustment in order to reach their full potential and provide the most value for the 
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organization. Common indications that the SIEM application is not performing 
effectively often include reports not accurately reflecting rule sets, or if other 
sources (mainly network administrators) are reporting incidents before the 
system has the opportunity (Dorgio, 2012). 
Finally, the most important consideration during the implementation of a 
SIEM application is the status of log files throughout the network. Without log 
data, a SIEM application is essentially useless. Lack of log data often results 
from several common configuration errors, including not logging files at all, 
deleting log files too soon, incorrectly prioritizing logs, or even ignoring the logs, 
which commonly occurs with internal network devices when organizations only 
focus on the perimeter (Chuvakin, 2004). Often the most effective mitigation to 
this problem is to implement a log management system independent of a SIEM 
application prior to purchasing a SIEM solution in order to ensure that proper log 
management occurs before adding the ability to correlate log data. 
2. Network and Hardware Issues 
Implementation of a SIEM application can have particular effects on a 
network. Mitigating these effects requires that particular attention be paid to both 
the host network and the SIEM application capabilities. For example, 
incompatible hardware or insufficient software can limit the amount of data that a 
SIEM application receives and therefore limits the capability that it can provide. 
Furthermore, optimum SIEM performance requires that it consolidate as much 
data from as many sources as possible, which can prove difficult in even the 
most efficiently designed network. 
Hardware issues are common occurrences during SIEM implementations. 
For example, log collection is generally measured is events per second (EPS) 
where a single entry in a log file correlates to one event. A generic enterprise 
network collects approximately 20,000 EPS over eight hours of an ongoing 
incident, which equates to approximately 576,000,000 data records (Butler, 
2009). Conservatively estimating a 300 byte average size of each record 
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amounts to 172.8 gigabytes of data (Butler, 2009). Memory availability, with 
respect to storage and RAM capacities are a huge concern when contemplating 
SIEM applications. Furthermore, limitations in the hardware capabilities of 
devices can also limit the effectiveness of a SIEM application. As an example, an 
average high- capacity firewall can process approximately 100,000 EPS, which 
would indicate that the agent or collector responsible for this device would need 
to be capable of processing the same amount (Butler, 2009). However, in the 
event that the installed agent or collector in the SIEM architecture cannot handle 
these processing speeds, how does one determine which of these 100,000 
events are significant?    Hardware issues, and in particular memory issues, must 
be overcome in order to effectively implement any substantial SIEM solution. 
Additionally, an organization must also consider its network capacity when 
installing a SIEM solution as well. Hundreds of gigabytes of data moving across a 
network in order to support a single application per day can choke the capability 
of any network, no matter how robust. Speed and capacity are the benchmarks 
of modern information networks, and anything that could potentially slow them 
down significantly detracts from their value (Butler, 2009). For example, installing 
a firewall is a prudent step toward achieving a more secure network, but when 
that same firewall limits the speed of the network from 10 Mbps to 3 Mbps, 
security comes at an unreasonable cost. Furthermore, while one can argue that 
no realistic scenario exists where every device on a network operating at 
maximum capacity and therefore sending the maximum EPS to the SIEM 
system, a large portion of these events can still create bottlenecks on the 
network. In order to maintain an effective SIEM solution that increases 
capabilities, the network must be able to support the additional load of SIEM data 
as well. 
3. Ethical Considerations 
The last remaining consideration in an SIEM solution involves the 
collection of large amounts of data. Raw log data collected by SIEM solutions 
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has the potential to contain a large amount of sensitive data. As such, privacy 
and compliance laws may limit the collection of this data or make it significantly 
more difficult to collect (Dorigo, 2012). Additionally, SIEM solutions do not just 
collect data from a selected group of sources, unless they are specifically 
configured that way. Collecting data from every device about every user has 
significant implications and can reveal a lot about what is going on within a 
network and who is doing what, which could potentially be considered an 
invasion of privacy (Dorigo, 2012). Furthermore, in order to mitigate the risk of 
privacy issues, additional considerations must be taken when storing log data 
from certain sources for long periods of time. These ethical issues must be 
considered when implementing a SIEM solution, and must be accounted for with 
additional resources and processing if necessary in order to ensure proper 




















III. DETERMINING THE VALUE OF A SIEM SOLUTION 
A. BACKGROUND 
Investments in information security capabilities present significant 
challenges to organizations. Modern cyber threats have the potential to cause 
massive damage to information systems while at the same time burdening 
organizations with monetary damage, corporate liability and tarnished credibility 
(Cavusoglu, 2003). Additionally, effective metrics for determining the value of 
security investments as well as their potential return on investment are difficult to 
determine. Defining security investment metrics also proves difficult due to the 
dynamic nature of the security environment. Evolving threats and 
countermeasures generate massive amounts of confusion in security investment 
strategy, often leading organizations to follow a security investment strategy 
geared toward alleviating fear, uncertainty and doubt (FUD). This is of particular 
concern when the cost of cyber crime worldwide is measured in trillions of 
dollars, and the average security budget claims only a fraction of the IT 
investment budget. 
Security investments, unlike traditional investments, are by definition 
incapable of generating revenue. Specifically, “no one buys a SIEM solution to 
generate revenue” (RSA – ROI). However, determining the best methods to 
mitigate the threats facing an organization is a difficult task with minimal budgets 
and a wide variety of security technologies in the market. Furthermore, added 
investment in security only provides so much capability before additional security 
measures become either ineffective or cost prohibitive (Cavusoglu, 2003). 
Effectively, determining the most prudent range of security capabilities is a 
multifaceted task, composed of risk assessment, technology architecture, 
policies and procedures (Cavusoglu, 2004). 
Regardless of the method of justifying a particular security investment, the 
costs associated with a security breach continue to rise and, more importantly, 
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are becoming more frequent occurrences amongst organizations of all kinds. In a 
recent study of the cost of cyber crime in 2012, researchers discovered that the 
average annualized cost of cyber crime is “$8.9 million per year, with a range of 
$1.4 million to $46 million” (Ponemon, 2012). This cost also represents a 6% 
increase from the study conducted in the previous year. Furthermore, one 
hundred and four successful attacks were reported among the participating 
organizations per week, marking an average 1.8 successful attacks per company 
per week (Ponemon, 2012).   
The cost of cyber crime also has lasting external costs associated with a 
successful breach of security systems. For example, a recent study uncovered 
that the announcement of a successful security breach also precipitates 
significant negative stock market reaction (Yayla & Hu, 2011). On average, a 
security breach results in a loss of 2.1% of the organization’s market value within 
two days of the event (Cavusoglu, 2003). Furthermore, this activity often leads to 
a perception of low security at the affected organization, which can often lead to 
future or successive attacks, or may “signal to the market a lack of concern for 
customer privacy and/or poor security practices” (Cavusoglu, 2003). Effectively, 
in order to contain both the internal and external costs associated with a security 
breach, an organization must not only invest in an effective security architecture, 
but must also cultivate the perception of a robust security architecture. Ironically, 
the most effective way to ensure both of these requirements is through thoughtful 
and persistent investment in advanced security systems.     
B. THE ECONOMIC VALUE OF INFORMATION SECURITY 
1. Background 
As the complexity of information systems increase in turn with the 
sophistication of the threats facing them, organizations continue to justify further 
investment in information security as merely a sunk cost. Most often, the value of 
a security investment, or even an existing security architecture can be difficult to 
quantify, thereby leading organizations to attempt to justify their expense through 
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qualitative means. These justifications lead to investment in information security 
on the understanding that security is a cost of doing business, or akin to 
insurance costs, or that security is one aspect of risk management (Lockstep, 
2004). Despite these justifications, information security should be viewed as a 
“value creator that supports and enables” the organization, rather than simply just 
a cost of doing business (Cavusoglu, 2003). More effective methods of 
determining information security investment strategy often acknowledge the 
qualitative reasoning involved with security spending, but also utilize economic 
returns and technical performance to further enhance their decision making 
(Iheagwara, 2004).   
Economic evaluation of a security investment remains the largest obstacle 
to implementing a new security technology. Measuring the return the investment 
could potentially provide is difficult because the methods of quantifying this value 
are determined by measuring the costs associated with something not happening 
to an organization. For example, the value of a firewall could be determined by 
the average costs associated with a security breach that were mitigated from the 
installation of the firewall. However, the value of the firewall remains unclear. The 
model for determining the RoI of the firewall cannot distinguish a mitigated attack 
from an attack that never occurred, so the value derived from not experiencing 
an attack is inherently ambiguous. 
Further inquiry into the value of a security investment according to the 
existing methods of valuation also fails to acknowledge the security architecture 
as a whole. Economic evaluation of IT security investments often does not 
account for how different security technologies interact with each other, which is 
a significant issue in determining the value of a particular investment. Security 
controls throughout the IT architecture may substitute or complement others, but 
the true value of a security mechanism, with respect to the capability it provides, 
depends on the capabilities of the surrounding mechanisms (Cavusoglu, 2003). 
This is the basic tenant of a Defense-In-Depth strategy. Effectively, 
complementary technologies implies that the value of a security investment is 
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greater based on the deployment of supporting technology than if the technology 
was deployed alone (Cavusoglu, 2003).   
Additional obstacles in determining the economic value of an information 
security investment deal primarily with the methods used to value the assets that 
a security device is intended to protect. Organizations place value on the assets 
in their inventory differently, whether they associate value of a breached 
computer as simply the replacement cost of the equipment, or whether they 
value the data contained on that device as well (Sonnenreich, 2006). 
Furthermore, the cost of a security incident is ambiguous as well. Costs 
associated with a security incident take many forms including cost of damage, 
the cost of responses to an incident, and operational costs (Iheagwara, 2004). 
This lack of standardization in valuation of assets and costs associated with 
security incidents often leads to inflated or abstruse results when determining the 
value of a security investment.   
There are several strategies in use that attempt to provide a valuation of 
potential security investments. Among these are the time-tested strategies of 
Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt (FUD), extensive risk mitigation strategies, as well 
as attempts to determine the most affordable security available given a specific 
organization’s financial constraints. Each of these strategies carries its own flaws 
and inconsistencies, primarily because they attempt to determine value in an 
investment that protects against loss rather than enables a measurable financial 
gain. However, in a world where information security threats are responsible for 
approximately $1.6 trillion in losses in the world economy and $266 billion in the 
United States alone, the need for a more effective method of determining the 
value of security investments continues to grow exponentially. 
2. Fear, Uncertainty and Doubt 
The Fear, uncertainty and Doubt (FUD) security investment strategy 
deserves acknowledgement because of the widespread utilization it enjoys 
throughout the information security industry. Often, the investment decision 
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regarding a specific security technology treats the solution like a black box 
expected to neutralize a newly discovered threat or mitigate some potential 
vulnerability. While this strategy does tend to provide some results, for example 
the application of virus scanning software has the ability to detect viruses when 
no scanner was used before, the continued use of this strategy cannot provide 
reasoned justification for future security investment. Effectively, this technique 
fails to provide managers with any insights into how the different variables 
associated with an IT security investment affect the “risk, expected loss, and 
likelihood,” of a particular security solutions and the threats it attempts to mitigate 
(Cavusoglu, 2003). While it costs far less to initially implement security measures 
than to recover from a security incident, this strategy offers no insight on what 
security measures to invest in or what capability to encourage. 
3. Cost of Deploying Security 
Another historical information security strategy deals primarily with the 
costs associated with deploying a particular security solution or set of solutions. 
Mostly, an organization considers the budgetary allowance they internally provide 
for security investments, if any, and decides upon the most capability available at 
the pre-determined price. Effectively, this strategy boils down to asking the 
question “What is the most I can get for $X, given that I am going to spend $X?” 
(Cavusoglu, 2004). The primary limitation of this model exists in the amount 
determined by the value $X. It offers no insight to the organization of how much 
they should be investing in IT security, nor does it attempt to justify the approved 
amount of the IT security budget. Additionally, determining an IT security 
investment strategy simply by assigning available capital to the security budget 
does not provide any insight on the risk exposure that the organization faces or 
account for mitigation efforts that should be employed given the potential threats 
targeting the organization specifically. For example, an organization in the 
defense industry and an organization in the entertainment industry have wildly 
different threats targeting their information systems in addition to dramatically 
different vulnerabilities within their information systems. An IT security investment 
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strategy for both of these organizations should be tailored to specific needs of the 
organization, rather than simply what funding is available. 
4. Risk Management 
The most advanced method of crafting an economically justifiable IT 
security investment strategy relies on determining the likelihood of a specific 
security event taking place and the costs associated with this specific event. 
Profiling the existing risks that an organization is exposed to not only provides a 
more accurate understanding of the security capabilities the organization 
requires, but can also help determine the “optimal amount to invest in security 
controls” by “considering the vulnerability to a breach and the potential loss 
associated with a breach” (Cavusoglu, 2003).   This optimal amount comes from 
estimating the expected loss from a security incident and determining that the 
level of investment in a solution to mitigate this vulnerability should cost no more 
than this expected level of loss (Iheagwara, 2004). Additionally, the value of this 
security investment strategy replaces financial metrics with mitigated risk as the 
primary deliverable, thereby adding value to the enterprise (Purser, 2004).  
There are limitations to implementing a security investment strategy based 
on risk management. Primarily, these limitations arise out of the uncertainty 
inherent in the estimation of the costs of security incidents and their likelihood. 
Because of the rapid pace of technological development in IT, information 
security factors continue to change making it much more difficult to acquire an 
adequate amount of historical data to determine the true costs associated with 
exposure to a particular risk as well as its rate of occurrence (Chai, Kim & Rao, 
2010). Also, the risk analysis associated with this particular strategy can show 
how a particular investment may not be economically justifiable, based on the 
amount of risk associated with a particular event. For example, investing enough 
to mitigate risk from very high levels or very low levels of vulnerability may not be 
economically justifiable or feasible (Cavusoglu, 2003). However, the fundamental 
flaw in a risk management based investment strategy is the fact that the 
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endeavor attempts to estimate how much an organization stands to lose from not 
investing in a particular security technology rather than how much it can benefit 
(Cavusoglu, 2003).   
C. METHODS OF QUANTIFYING THE ROI OF A SIEM SOLUTION 
1. Background 
Quantifying a return on investment for information security solutions is 
inherently difficult because of the benefit that the security technology provides. 
Essentially, the purpose of a particular security solution is to prevent something 
from happening, and therefore avoid losses associated with that event. However, 
it is particularly difficult to measure these avoided losses because of the fact that 
they simply did not occur (Rosenquist, 2007). Furthermore, measuring ROI of 
network security devices proves even more difficult when attempting to 
accurately calculate the risk associated with a particular event because of the 
intrinsic subjectivity of network security events (Iheagwara, 2004). Major security 
events are rare occurrences, typically three or even six sigma events, but 
because of the subjectivity of these events, it is incredibly difficult to determine if 
a major security event was mitigated because of the inclusion of a new network 
security device, or if it never actually occurred.   
The only factors of ROI that can be measured with a modest amount of 
certainty are the costs associated with a security investment. A SIEM solution, 
like all other information system investments comes with an assortment of costs 
including an acquisition cost, implementation costs, administration costs and 
maintenance costs (RSA –ROI). However, these costs do not account for the 
infrastructure costs or the agility costs, which deal with the degradation of prior 
investments and the inhibition of business, respectively (IANS, 2011). Therefore, 
even the costs associated with a security investment retain an amount of 
uncertainty, making it even more difficult to quantify the ROI of an investment. 
The difficulty in measuring the ROI of security investments often leads to 
firms adopting subpar investment strategies, or investing in needless security 
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solutions. The difficulty in determining the ROI of security investments rests 
primarily on the difficulty in measuring the benefit produced by the security 
solution. Potential losses avoided are difficult to measure based on the 
probability of occurrence and also because “constantly evolving security 
programs, threats, and environmental changes limit the absolute accuracy of any 
predictive method based on historical trending data” (Rosenquist, 2007). 
However, despite the qualitative justification of many security expenditures, often 
the only way to justify a security investment to decision-makers is to show how 
investments impact the bottom line. 
2. Cost Avoidance 
The primary motivation to invest in any security solution is cost avoidance. 
Effectively, the decision to invest in a security solution is primarily driven by the 
fear of incurring losses associated with a security incident. However, the 
likelihood of a catastrophic cost avoidance scenario is incredibly low, which 
removes a great deal of the value attributed to the security solution (RSA – ROI). 
Furthermore, any analysis of a cost avoidance scenario based on single-point 
estimates is inherently flawed (Mun, 2010). Ultimately, the effectiveness of a cost 
avoidance model stems from its ability to engage non-technical stakeholders by 
attempting to quantify the qualitative benefits associated with good information 
security into a rudimentary financial benefits model (Lockstep, 2004).   
The cost avoidance model can be further examined based upon the type 
of losses a security measure attempts to mitigate. For example, a security 
countermeasure can have one of two effects on a threat: “it can reduce the 
likelihood of the threat manifesting as an incident, and/or it can reduce the 
severity of the incident should it actually occur” (Lockstep, 2004). Effectively, 
avoided losses can be ascribed to either preventative security countermeasures 
or curative security countermeasures, deriving further incentive to invest in the 
solution. 
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3. Annualized Loss Expectancy 
Another common method of determining the ROI of a security investment 
is to determine the Annualized Loss Expectancy (ALE). The ALE attempts to 
quantify the costs associated with a single security incident without 
countermeasures in place and with countermeasures in place. Effectively, this 
approach compares the untreated losses that an organization expects to face 
and compares those losses to the cost of the security investment required to 
mitigate these losses (Lockstep, 2004).   
Calculating the ROI of a security investment utilizing the ALE model 
requires the calculation of a number of variables. First, the model calculates a 
Single Loss Expectancy (SLE) by determining the Asset Value (AV) and then 
multiplying it by the Exposure Factor (EF) and the Cascading Threat Multiplier 
(CTM) as shows in the below equation (Iheagwara, 2004). 
 SLE = EF × AV × CTM 
 
The Cascading Threat Multiplier is used to more accurately determine the 
ROI of a security investment by estimating the impact that the threat has on other 
networked assets, known as the Underlying Exposed Assets (UEA) multiplied by 
a Secondary Exposure Factor (EFs) (Iheagwara, 2004). CTM is calculated using 
the following formula: 
 CTM = 1 + ((UEA × EFs) ÷ AV) 
Underlying exposed assets is measured in dollars and represents the 
assets that are now exposed due to the compromise of a specific asset 
(Iheagwara, 2004). Likewise, Exposure Factor (EFs) represents the secondary 
exposure factor related to the potential percentage loss of the underlining assets 
(Iheagwara, 2004).   
The ALE is then calculated by multiplying the Annual Rate of Occurrence 
(ARO), predetermined by either observation or historical data, and by the SLE: 
 ALE = ARO × SLE 
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ROI is determined by finding the difference between the recovery cost and 
the ALE, shown in the equation below. Where recovery cost (R) refers to the 
losses associated with in an environment where a security solution has not been 
deployed. 
 ROI = R − ALE 
The ALE model provides many benefits to determining the ROI of a 
security investment, but the most compelling of them is its simplicity. Effectively, 
the model derives the potential value of a security investment through four simple 
equations and a few generalizations drawn from historical data or experience. 
However, moving away from its compulsion to adhere to single-point estimates 
and averages could enhance the model. Adding some variability into the model 
could assist in the justification of the investment by reducing some of the 
uncertainty in the actual cost of security incidents as well as their likelihood. 
4. Return on Security Investment 
Utilizing the Return on Security Investment (ROSI) model developed by 
Rosenquist follows several specific steps in order to accurately determine the 
value of a security investment. Determining the ROSI follows the following steps 
(Rosenquist, 2007): 
 Evaluate cyber-attack incident data averages over time. 
 Measure the reduction of incidents from implementing new security 
programs. 
 Valuate the impact of avoided incidents. 
 Apply the results to similar areas to estimate future value. 
While Rosenquist’s methodology has intrinsic value within it, the model 
does not allow for decision-makers to estimate the value of the security 
investment prior to implementation. The model does allow for comparative 
analysis between similar security investments, but the true value of the 
investment, following these specific steps, cannot be determined until the 
organization has the ability to observe a reduction in security incidents. Even 
then, the reduction in security incidents may not be directly attributable to the 
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new security device, thereby artificially inflating the value of the investment as 
well. 
5. Return on Security 
The Institute for Applied Network Security (IANS) developed an additional 
model attempting to quantify the value of a security investment in financial terms. 
Effectively, the IANS Return on Security (ROS) method “aims to correct the 
shortcomings of other cost-benefit analyses and produce a metric that is 
especially well suited to the unique qualities of a security project” (IANS, 2011). 
The IANS ROS attempts to provide this metric by expanding the area that the 
value of a security investment affects and specifically defining the costs 
associated with the investment.   
The sources of value are defined as Objective Value (OV), Risk Value 
(RV), Infrastructure Value (IV) and Agility Value (AV) (IANS, 2011). Objective 
value refers to the achievement of a specific business goal. Risk value is defined 
as the reduction of risk. Infrastructure Value refers to the improvement of prior 
investments following the implementation of the security investment. Agility Value 
refers to the enabling of new business or business processes as a result of the 
improved security capability. The costs associated with the ROS model are 
defined as Objective Cost (OC), Infrastructure Cost (IC) and Agility Cost (AC) 
(IANS, 2011). Objective cost defines the price of purchasing, implementing and 
maintaining the security solution. Infrastructure costs attempts to define any 
degradation of prior investments as a result of the security investment. Lastly, 
Agility cost relates the impact of the security investment on the convenience of 
business processes or the development of new ones. 
 ROS is then calculated through the following equation: 
 ROS = (OV + RV + IV + AV) – (OC + IC + AC) 
The primary issue with the IANS ROS model remains the uncertainty 
associated with estimating the values of each individual variable. Furthermore, 
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the values of AV and AC specifically may not be accurately estimated or 
measured until after deploying the security solution and observing the effects. 
6. ROSI and ALE Hybrid Models 
The Lockstep ROSI model effectively combines the output of the ALE 
model as well as the Australian-standard Threat and Risk Assessment (TRA) 
model in order to provide a common model that can account for statistical 
deviations (Lockstep, 2004). According to Lockstep, the model carries the 
following advantages: 
 Financially quantitative 
 Separates the contributions made to overall security cost-benefit 
analysis according to specific security countermeasures 
 Makes use of a familiar tool 
 Provides statistical modeling to allow for the variable nature and 
impact of real life security threats 
 Utilizing the model embraces the advantages contained within the 
simplicity of the ALE model, but also adds the ability to account for uncertainty 
through advanced statistical analysis. Effectively, this allows the decision-maker 
to not only view the potential return on investment of a security technology, but 
also to analyze the probability of achieving that return, all within the same model. 
D. ADDITIONAL VALUATION OF SIEM SOLUTIONS 
1. Soft Benefits 
Application of a SIEM solution provides significant value to an organization 
that financial models fail to grasp. These soft benefits take the form of increased 
productivity, heightened situational awareness, broader security visibility and 
enhanced knowledge of the network environment (ArcSight, 2009). The value of 
these benefits far outweigh the costs associated with a SIEM implementation, 
and can further increase the value of an organization’s information systems 
beyond what can be measured in dollars and cents.   
 41
The most valuable soft benefit of a SIEM solution, which effectively 
defines the entire motivation for implementing a SIEM solution, is the knowledge 
that a SIEM system provides about the host network. An average organization 
employing between 1,000 and 5,000 employees will experience an average of 
81,893,882 security events per year (IBM, 2013). A security event can take the 
form of anything from an active network scan to an e-mail phishing attempt. 
However, determining the true nature of a network attack through all of those 
individual events is not only impractical, but also impossible. On average, a 
similar organization employing a SIEM solution gains the ability to sift through all 
of those events and discern the real network attacks from the network noise, 
distilling the huge amount of events down into an average of 73,400 attacks per 
year (IBM, 2013). Effectively, a SIEM solution exposes an enterprise to all the 
risk that already existed on their network that they could not previously detect (IT 
Business Edge, 2013). Without a SIEM solution to gather, correlate and display 
all of the actionable security events across a network, the majority of the attacks 
would have gone unnoticed.   
Determining the economic value of a SIEM implementation by determining 
the return an investment in the technology can provide makes the endeavor 
economically justifiable, but it misses the true value of the solution. SIEM 
systems may never deliver a return on investment in the strictest of sense, but 
they can deliver quantifiable value after the decision to invest in the technology. 
The value generated by a SIEM system in terms of minimized risk and cost 
avoidance are only magnified by the value provided to an enterprise from 
increased knowledge of their information systems in addition to process and 
workflow efficiencies (RSA – ROI).   
2. Compliance 
SIEM solutions also provide additional value to an enterprise through their 
ability to assist in maintaining and enforcing compliance requirements in 
accordance with established regulations and legislation. Most notably, SIEM 
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implementations are able to account for the majority of requirements placed on 
organizations with respect to log management, reporting requirements, as well as 
requirements for advanced security. Furthermore, SIEM systems also increase 
the capability of IT staff with respect to log management and archival, reducing 
the amount of time, cost and effort required to meet the requirements mandated 
by regulation (RSA – ROI).   
3. Productivity 
SIEM solutions also add value to the enterprise by increasing the 
productivity of both employees and network assets. SIEM systems allow 
organizations to automate a large portion of their information system 
management responsibilities, reducing the costs of device management (Prism 
Microsystems, 2007). This reduction in demand on staff to accomplish device 
management tasks could even reduce costs further by allowing organizations to 
do more with less people. However, if an organization is already doing more with 
less, the increased productivity of staff allows them to accomplish more without 
increasing the headcount (RSA – ROI). Additionally, SIEM solutions also assist in 
reducing the number of support calls to internal help desks as well as reduce the 
rime required to solve issues by providing better diagnostic tools, thereby 
preventing or predicting disruption (Prism Microsystems, 2007).   
Maintaining availability to network assets by preventing resource outages 
also increases the productivity of an organization by reducing staff downtime. 
The automated event management provided by SIEM solutions allows 
organizations to avoid disruptions from security incidents or network events while 
at the same time provides the ability to “resolve issues more quickly, thereby 
reducing overall impact on the user community and improving business 
continuity” (Prism Microsystems, 2007). Additionally, because SIEM systems 
provide immediate notification of critical events and trends, organizations can 
shift to a proactive stance instead of a reactive stance, avoiding system failure 
and improving network functionality. 
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E. CASE STUDIES 
1. Background 
The following cases describe success stories of organizations that 
implemented a SIEM solution within their network environment. They detail both 
the intended application of the system, the return on investment achieved after 
the investment in a SIEM application, and also many cases of added value that 
the system provided. 
2. Security Event Management 
A mid-size organization implemented a SIEM system to initially monitor 
40% of their network. After four months the system detected more security 
events than all other detection methods combined (Thurman, 2011). Proactively 
detecting these threats also saved on help desk costs and lost productivity. 
An organization implementing HP ArcSight’s SIEM system saw a 
reduction of their critical incident rate to fewer than 200 per hour, representing a 
decrease of over 93% (ArcSight, 2009). Additionally, the improved detective 
capability allowed the organization to repurpose 75% of their IT security staff to 
strategic efforts (ArcSight, 2009).   
Using new intelligence gathered from a SIEM system a “firm’s anti-fraud 
team was able to stop illegitimate bank transfers worth nearly $900,000 within 
the first week. The combination of real-time correlation and pin-point accuracy 
allowed the bank to find and stop these transactions, translating to a payback 
period of less than a week” (ArcSight, 2009). 
A national cooking supply company has been able to cut half the time it 
takes to perform a security audit, and reduced their incident response time by 
75% (RSA – ROI). 
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3. Increased Productivity 
“A financial institution realized significant manpower savings on incident 
handling and forensic analysis. In one example, a denial of access investigation 
that used to take the company’s security analysts four days took ten minutes” 
(RSA – ROI). 
“A large U.S. financial institution with strict log retention requirements was 
able to save 80% of their file share disk space and the man hours associated 
with log purging and maintenance issues” (RSA – ROI). 
An organization was able to reduce personnel expansion by approximately 
85% over three years based on increased productivity of existing staff, effectively 
recovering the SIEM investment in a little more than three months due to the cost 
savings on staff (ArcSight, 2009). 
4. Regulatory Compliance 
A U.S. based retailer realized a 60% savings in the time it spent meeting 
SOX and PCI requirements (RSA, 2009). 
A regional utility company estimated that it spent over 8,500 man-hours at 
a cost of approximately $1.5 million dollars preparing for their SOX audit. After 
implementation of a SIEM solution, their total time required to prepare for the 
audit was reduced to only 900 hours—”a reduction of nearly 90%. The cost 
savings on the effort resulted in a payback period of the SIEM investment of just 
39 days (ArcSight, 2009). 
In order to meet UK Government security auditing standards, a UK-based 
service provider estimated that it required six man-years each year to manually 
extract and review the required logs. After the implementation of a SIEM solution, 
the system made it possible for a single staff member to meet all required 
obligations while only spending four hours per week on the assignment (RSA, 
2009). 
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5. Other Sources of Value 
While monitoring call center representative behavior, ArcSight 
discovered an unusually heavy use of printing resources – roughly 
a million pages at a cost of about $100,000 in printer lease, paper 
and toner cartridges each month. A quick investigation unveiled the 
fact that most of the employees were also students and were using 
the organization’s resources to print textbooks, papers and a host 
of material unrelated to their job. This analysis alone demonstrated 
an ArcSight ESM investment payback period of just 2 ½ months, 
and the on-going savings have paid back the initial SIEM outlay 













































IV. APPLICATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY ROI MODELS 
TO A SIEM SOLUTION IN A NOTIONAL DOD ENVIRONMENT 
A. ASSUMPTIONS 
1. Single-Point Estimate Models 
Calculating the potential return on investment for SIEM solutions requires 
the use of several basic assumptions in order to effectively apply a single-point 
estimation model examining potential cost savings. Utilizing this model will 
adhere to the following assumptions: 
 The number of security incidents will follow the trend set forth in the 
report GAO-12–666T filed by the United States Government 
Accountability Office describing current cyber security threats 
facing the nation. This trend shows a growth rate in the number of 
cyber security incidents across federal agencies of approximately 
680% every five years. According to this trend, Table 1 shows the 
projected number of cyber security incidents reported by federal 
agencies for the next five years based on existing data. (Wilshusen, 
2012) 
 
Table 1.   Number of Cyber Incidents Against Federal Agencies Reported to 
U.S. CERT 
 The Ponemon Institutes 2012 report on the cost of cyber crime 
estimated that the annual cost of successful cyber attacks in the 
United States is approximately $8.9 million. Furthermore, this 
institute determined a weekly successful attack rate of 102 attacks 
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per week. Utilizing this annual rate, one can assume that an annual 
average of 5,304 successful attacks. From this, it can be assumed 
that the average cost of a single incident is approximately 
$1,684.30. Table 2 demonstrates this understanding. (Ponemon, 
2012) 
 
Table 2.   Average Cost of a Single Cyber Incident 
 The Ponemon Institute estimates that the average time required to 
resolve a successful cyber attack is 18 days (Ponemon, 2012). This 
constitutes approximately 192 working hours. 
 The employment of a mid-size DoD enterprise is estimated at 
consisting of approximately 1,000 people. Assuming a ratio of 
commissioned officers to enlisted personnel of 5:1, and applying a 
hierarchical pay scale based on published pay rates for military 
personnel available from the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service (DFAS), the average hourly income of a single staff 
member equates to approximately $40 per hour. 
 In order to simplify the compliance reporting requirements on each 
DoD agency, the model utilizes a minimum of twelve annual 
reports, as defined by White House Memorandum M-12–20 
outlining the FY 2012 Reporting Instructions for the Federal 
Information Security Management Act and Agency Privacy 
Management (ZIENTS, 2012). 
B. COST REDUCTION 
1. Model Description 
The basic single-point estimation model utilized in this study follows the 
basic components of the Alinean ROI tool (HP, 2012). The model examines cost 
savings as a source of return on investment, determining a conservative, 
probable and optimistic estimate based on the effectiveness of the security 
solution. This research will attempt to determine an estimate of potential ROI 
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utilizing this model in the areas of network vulnerability discovery, integrated 
threat detection, automated containment and detection, productivity and 
compliance reporting. This study has determined that these areas are the most 
valuable aspects of a SIEM solution in a DoD environment. 
2. Increased Network-Based Vulnerability Discovery 
One of the primary benefits of a SIEM solution is the advanced security 
capability drawn from the intelligence gathered from disparate network security 
devices. As a result, the overall effectiveness of the network security architecture 
increases. This is particularly the case when initially deploying a SIEM solution 
and discovering all of the risk that a network is exposed to but was previously 
unknown. Table 3 shows the estimated cost savings of a SIEM solution based on 
its ability to affect change in the annual number of successful network based 
attacks. Assuming an average cost incurred on the organization of a successful 
network attack equals approximately $1,684.30, and that the number of 
successful network based attacks reported by DoD agencies in 2012 is 
approximately 122, the total cost of these attacks equals over $200,000.   
Estimating this cost after implementation of a SIEM solution shows an 
incredible amount of cost savings, compared to the untreated cost of 
$206,697.30. Even a conservative estimate shows a potential reduction in 
successful attacks of 20% resulting in a cost savings of over $40,000. 
Additionally, following the assumed increase in successful attacks shows even 
greater reduction in costs over the next five years. Ultimately, the even the 
conservative estimates point to an immediate costs savings of approximately 






Table 3.   Potential Cost Savings of Increased Network-Based Vulnerability Discovery 
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3. Integrated Threat Detector 
In addition to discovering threats that were previously unknown, SIEM 
solutions effectively increase the capability of existing network security devices 
by correlating events across them, distilling threat patterns and detecting low 
volume intrusion attempts. In order to reflect this increase in capability, the point-
estimate model assumes a percentage change in the number of successful 
network attacks ranging from a conservative estimate of a 10% decrease, to an 
optimistic estimate of a 30% decrease. 
Utilizing these projected decreases in successful attacks as well as data 
drawn from CERT statistics and the Ponemon Institute to determine the average 
number of successful attack and the average cost of attack, Table 4 shows the 
potential cost savings of a SIEM solution. These estimates are based on the 
reduction of successful attacks due to the ability of SIEM solutions to actively 
detect attacks in real or near real-time through aggregation and correlation of log 
data from various network security devices. The conservative estimate shows 
potential savings ranging from $20,669.73 to $62,009.19 in the first year of 
deployment. Furthermore, based on successful attack projections for the next 
five years, the cost savings benefit is projected to increase at a rate of 




Table 4.   Potential Cost Savings Leveraging SIEM Integrated Threat Detection 
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4. Automated Detection and Containment 
Another impressive security feature of SIEM applications is their ability to 
automatically apply mitigation efforts when a potential threat is detected. These 
efforts can be applied to a specific attack pattern or signature and can also 
increase in severity given the nature of the detected threat. For example, after 
detecting unauthorized access to confidential data from an internal user, the 
SIEM application can be configured to automatically suspend that users access 
to various network services. Additionally, SIEM systems also provide notification 
of these events in a manner consistent with their perceived threat. For example, 
detecting a network scan would result in a routine notification to a security 
analyst’s inbox, whereas an active intrusion could trigger alarms and immediate 
notification of security staff through a variety of means.  
The primary areas of concern when determining cost savings due to 
detection and containment protocols concern the number of successful attacks 
and the time taken to resolve an attack. As a result, in this model the cost 
savings are realized by reducing the number of successful attacks through 
enhanced detection methods and also reducing the average time that it takes to 
fully resolve an attack due to the speed of automatic procedures. 
The results shown in Table 5 represent the cost savings provided by 
reducing the number of security incidents that security analysts respond to as 
well as the average time that it takes to resolve the incident. The Ponemon 
institute estimates that the average time taken to resolve a security incident is 
approximately eighteen days, which works out to about 192 working hours. 
Applying a fully burdened labor rate of $65 per hour to a security analyst, the 
potential cost savings of an SIEM solution become readily apparent. As a result 
of the reduction in resolution time, thanks to automated security protocols and 
SIEM’s notification system, provides substantial cost savings by requiring less 
labor from security staff. Based on the conservative estimate of approximately 
one hundred successful attacks and a reduction of less than twenty hours to 
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resolve each attack, a firm can expect nearly a $500,000 cost savings. 
Additionally, the ability of SIEM systems to distill relevant security information 
from torrents of data has been proven to effectively reduce the workload of 
security staff significantly. Therefore, it is not unlikely that an organization could 
expect to see the optimistic results of this cost savings model, which could result 




Table 5.   Potential Cost Savings of Automated Detection and Containment 
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5. End User Productivity 
User productivity is measured by reducing the amount of network outage 
time. SIEM solutions assist in maintaining availability of network services by 
increasing the security capabilities of the network and also by providing network 
information that can be used to predict and diagnose potential issues. In this 
single-point estimate model, the cost savings is realized from the reduction of 
annual outage time, measured in hours. From this, the average hourly salary of 
the staff multiplied by the total number of hours that services are not available 
determines the cost of a network outage. 
The data contained Table 6 estimates the annual outage time in hours of a 
DoD agency employing approximately 1,000 individuals. Current military 
employment ratios suggest an officer to enlisted employment ratio of approximately 
1:5. As a result, the pay scheme of this organization results in an average hourly 
wage of approximately $45.00. Additionally, the model assumes that despite a 
disruption in network services, employees are able to maintain at least 50% 
productivity by either accomplishing other tasks or completing work offline. 
The results of the model show that even a conservative reduction in 
downtime has the potential to save significant amounts of money across the 
organization. From reducing the network downtime by only twenty-five hours, 
from one hundred to merely seventy-five per year, the organization has the 
potential to realize $750,000 annually in cost savings. More likely, the loss of 
productivity as a result of network downtime will not result in such a sweeping 
reduction in productivity across every employee of an organization. However, 
even reducing the amount that the lack of network resource availability affects 
employee productivity results in significant cost savings. For example, reducing 
the amount of network downtime, even if the resulting average productivity 
reduction is only approximately 10%, the organization will still realize an annual 
cost savings of $150,000. As a result, the cost savings potential derived from 
57 
reduced network downtime represents the simplest and most effective means of 
determining the potential return on investment of a SIEM solution. 
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Table 6.   Projected Cost Savings Based on Increased User Productivity 
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6. Automatic Compliance Reporting 
Many regulations related to information systems and network security 
systems require large amounts of effort to ensure compliance with their 
established standards. Often, in order to achieve full compliance, organizations 
must submit detailed reports containing network statistics, extensive details of 
information system configurations or even large amounts of log data. SIEM 
solutions assist in maintaining full compliance with all mandated regulations by 
providing a simple means of compiling the required reports. The cost savings 
result from the decreased amount of time required to produce each of these 
reports. 
For example, federal agencies are required to submit monthly compliance 
reports to U.S.-CERT through the CyberScope program (Zients, 2012). Table 7 
estimates the costs associated with these efforts, assuming each report requires 
approximately one hundred hours of effort from a security analyst in order to 
gather all of the relevant log data on potential cyber attacks as well as the 
configurations of all of the affected systems. The estimated annual cost to 
produce these reports equals $78,000. Reducing the amount of time required by 
each analyst in the production of each report has the potential to reveal modest 
annual cost savings, depending on the effectiveness of the SIEM application. 
Effectively, the cost savings resulting from each potential reduction in work time 
producing compliance reports has the ability to realize anywhere from $7,800 to 
$23,400 annually. While this is much more modest of a cost savings than 
previously examined applications of a SIEM solution, it still represents additional 





Table 7.   Potential Cost Savings Enabled through Automatic Compliance Reporting 
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C. RISK MANAGEMENT AND LOSS AVOIDANCE 
1. Background 
Many variations of the return on security investment model exist, each of 
which attempts to justify investment in a particular security technology based on 
the ability to reduce risk and avoid losses. These models all determine the return 
on a security investment to be equivalent to the difference between the treated 
and untreated losses. However, many of them fail to account for the inherent 
uncertainty of information security events. Effectively, the majority of the existing 
models base the rate of occurrence of security events on single-point averages. 
However, these models fail to consider the strategy or incentive of the hacker, 
and therefore generalize the rate of occurrence of malicious attacks. This is of 
particular concern to DoD agencies as DoD information systems represent a 
choice target. 
Dr. Johnathan Mun’s IT Intrusion Management model represents a risk 
management model that incorporates uncertainty in the rate of occurrence of 
attacks. Furthermore, with the incorporation of Monte Carlo risk simulations a 
number of variables in the model including percentage of network affected and 
percentage of workforce affected, the model adds additional variation into the 
computation of potential losses due to cyber attacks (Mun, 2010). The model 
compares a current state, based on the existing security investments, against a 
future state based on the inclusion of new technology (Mun, 2010). The primary 
measurement drawn from the model is the cost associated with loss of 
operational productivity defined as the loss of employee working hours due to 
network outage.   
Simplifying the model to represent a notional DoD network took several 
steps. Primarily, the reduction of the staff to 1,000 personnel reflects a mid-sized 
DoD agency in addition to providing some comparison against the single-point 
estimate model previously utilized. Additionally, the number of networks within 
the organization was reduced to two, the Non-Classified Internet Protocol Router 
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Network (NIPR) and Secret Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) networks, in order to 
simplify the model.   
2. Current State Versus Future State 
Examining the potential application of a SIEM solution against a current 
state reveals the potential cost savings the application provides in terms of 
productivity. According to the IT Intrusion Management model, the different 
classes of attacks, detailed in Appendix E, each class of attacks has a general 
amount of disruption that it causes on a network. Figure 2 defines the 
percentages that each class of attack disrupts the network and the workforce. 
These estimates are derived from interviews with multiple technical experts in the 
field of information security (Mun, 2010). 
 
Figure 1.  Approximate Impact of Cyber Attacks 
The model also accounts for variations in these amounts as well. The 
future state of the model, after the implementation of a SIEM solution reduces the 
uncertainty of these values, as a result of the increased effectiveness of the 
security architecture with the addition of the SIEM application’s detective and 
preventative capabilities. Additionally, the future state differs from the current 
state model in the respect that it assumes a 75% reduction in productivity loss as 
a result of the increased diagnostic and preventative capability inherent in the 
SIEM solution. Table 8 shows the comparison of impact that each attack class 
has on the network and the potential percentage of losses avoided by 
implementing the future state. 
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Table 8.   Estimated Cost of Cyber Attack on Current State versus Future State 
Security Architectures 
Additionally, the IT Intrusion Management model provides a means to 
estimate the rate of occurrence of potential classes of attacks in order to 
determine the potential amount of damage incurred by a combination of attacks 
over a span of five years. Utilizing the most likely scenario in the model, Scenario 
VI, represents a more likely attack scenario experienced by DoD agencies. 
However, because of the inherent value of DoD information systems, they 
represent a much more desirable target to more advanced threats. Therefore, the 
rate of occurrence of each of the attack classes must be adjusted slightly to 
account for this. Table 9 reflects the adjusted rates of occurrence for each class 
of attack.   
These estimations of the ARO of the classes of cyber attacks against DoD 
networks are inflated with respect to the ARO’s associated with cyber attacks 
against other agencies. These inflations are based on direct observations 
reported from DoD agencies in addition to historical evidence of significant cyber 
security events. For example, the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) maintains a running list of all significant cyber security events worldwide 
since 2006 (CSIS, 2006). These significant events represent at least a Class IV 
attack or higher, as they primarily detail security events involving a determined 
malicious hacker or group of hackers and sometimes carry accusations of state 
run cyber crime. Examining the results of their research reveals that over the last 
seven years, eleven of the one hundred and twenty four significant cyber security 
events worldwide targeted either the DoD directly, or an affiliated agency. 
Effectively, nearly 10% of all significant cyber security events worldwide are 
directed at DoD agencies or their affiliated agencies. These attacks range from 
data breaches of personnel files or technological information on weapons 
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systems to the real-time interception of surveillance drone communications 
(Rosenzweig, 2012). Furthermore, this data supports announcements made by 
the Pentagon in 2012, asserting that their information systems endure 
approximately 10 million cyber attacks a day (Fryer-Biggs, 2012).   
 
Table 9.   Estimated Annual Rate of Occurrence of Cyber Attacks 
Running the model with these adjusted rates of occurrence, the total 
amount of losses incurred between the current state and the future state is easily 
discernable. Table 10 summarizes the findings. 
Effectively, over a span of five years, the impact of multiple attacks of 
various classes against the network is nearly one million dollars lower in the 
future state than the current state. At each year within the table the model 
calculates the total impact on both the current state and future state along with 
the variance and the risk adjustment between the two states. The variance refers 
to the percentage amount of losses avoided as a result of the implementation of 
the future state security architecture (Mun, 2010). The risk adjustment measures 
the difference between the impact on the current state and future state (Mun, 
2010).   
The risk adjustment value essentially captures the total potential losses 
that the two states are likely to endure. Additionally, comparing the risk 
adjustment and variance between years one through five, one can observe that 
even in the event of multiple successful attacks in a single year, the impact on 
the future state remains between 60% and 70% of the impact on the current 
state. Concurrently, the variance only decreases by a minimal amount as the 
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sophistication of the attacks increases. For example, despite only a 6.4% 
decrease in variance between year four and year five, the value of the risk 
adjustment of year four is nearly $600,000 greater, despite enduring multiple 
attacks of much greater magnitude. 
 
 
Table 10.   Losses Incurred As a Result of the Most Likely Attack Scenario 
Examining the distribution of total impact on the current state and future 
state over one thousand trials also supports the future state. Figure 2 and Figure 
3 show the results from the Monte Carlo risk simulations. Estimating the most 
frequent impact value from both distributions shows a drastically lower value for 
the future state. Even the most unlikely values displayed at the far right tails of 
the distributions show significantly higher impacts in the current state than the 
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future state. Additionally, the difference between the minimum values on the far 
left of the distribution scales show approximately a $300,000 difference in the 
least likely, least costly outcomes between the current state and the future state. 
 
Figure 2.  Distribution of Potential Impact on the Current State 
 
Figure 3.  Distribution of the Potential Impact on the Future State 
Ultimately, the distributions shown in Figure 2 and 3 shows that the future 
state, over one thousand simulations, is far more likely to provide significantly 
reduced losses. Effectively, the future state characterized by the implementation 
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of a SIEM solution provides much more capability in reducing risk, which in this 
model is primarily defined by the reduction of productivity loss on the 
organization. However, applying confidence intervals to the distributions in Figure 
2 and Figure 3 show additional insight into the observed impacts on the future 
state and the current state. 
 
Figure 4.  Distribution of Potential Impact on Current State with 90% Confidence 
Intervals 
Figure 4 and Figure 5 show the distributions of potential impacts on the 
current state and future state over one thousand simulations with 90% 
confidence intervals. These intervals indicate, with 90% certainty, that the lowest 
impact on both the current state and future state will be approximately $505,039 
and $125,093, respectively. Effectively, given the uncertainty of cyber attacks 
and their AROs, a DoD agency can expect to still endure at least $505,039 in 
losses in the event of the best-case scenario occurring. Conversely, the future 
state displays the potential to avoid nearly $400,000 in losses.  
Examining the upper confidence interval reveals similar conclusions. With 
90% certainty, the greatest impact on both the current state and future state is 
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$2,973,618 and $884,928, respectively. The difference between the significance 
of the upper and lower confidence intervals effectively boils down to the 
likelihood of enduring cyber attacks of greater magnitudes. Despite the frequency 
of occurrence of the observed impacts at the higher confidence level, these 
represent the impacts of higher classes of cyber attacks, which are of particular 
concern to the DoD. Effectively, the impact values at the upper 90% confidence 
interval represent a value close to the worst-case scenarios for both the current 
state and the future state. Still, the results are drastically different, showing a 
difference in impact of nearly two million dollars. 
 
Figure 5.  Distribution of Potential Impact on Future State with 90% Confidence 
Intervals 
Applying a left-tail 95% confidence interval to the distribution reveals the 
greatest impact, with 95% certainty, that each state has the potential to endure. 
After one thousand trials, the values of these potential maximum impacts for the 
current state and future state are $2,973,618 and $884,928, respectively. 
Essentially, these values equate to the most likely worst-case scenario that either 
state is likely to endure.   
69 
 
Figure 6.  Distribution of Potential Impact on Current State with a Left-Tail 95% 
Confidence Interval 
The difference between these worst-case scenarios is approximately 
$2,100,000. While this represents a significant difference between the potential 
losses avoided between the current state and future state, it does adequately 
reflect the amount that should be invested in the SIEM solution represented in 
the future state. Effectively, the 95% confidence interval suggests that the DoD 
could spend any amount between almost $900,000 and $2,000,000 to achieve 
the reduction of impact associated with the future state. However, given the 
sensitivity of information and data contained on DoD information networks, it is 
likely that the agency intends to minimize as much risk as possible. 
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A. POTENTIAL RISKS 
Application of a SIEM solution to any network environment carries its own 
internal risks, in addition to the pressure of economically justifying the 
investment. Primarily the concerns surrounding a SIEM deployment revolve 
around the amount of data to which the system has access. In order to effectively 
utilize the SIEM correlation capability, the system must aggregate data from as 
many sources as possible. However, in a DoD network environment, data 
sharing among various sources could potentially leak sensitive information. 
Additionally, the added bandwidth requirement to moves these large data files 
across the network could slow down critical network segments that support 
combat operations. 
The potential benefits of a SIEM solution in a DoD environment, however, 
far outweigh the implementation risks. Effective mitigation of advanced cyber 
threats requires broader utilization of existing network security technologies as 
well as the application of systems that can correlate data across these devices. 
An organization like the DoD that represents a choice target for emerging 
sophisticated threats, including state supported threats, requires the ability to 
mitigate the risks of these threats quickly and effectively. The advanced security 
capabilities offered by SIEM solution in addition to the value that they extract 
from existing investments more than justifies their implementation in a DoD 
environment. 
B. LIMITATIONS 
1. Current Study 
Potential limitations of this study revolve primarily around the inclusion of 
single-point estimates in costing models and the inability to accurately account 
for the targeting subjectivity of advanced cyber threats. While flawed, the use of 
single-point estimates in the model represents an assumption of the costs or 
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frequencies associated with specific security events. For example, it cannot be 
accurate estimated that each class I security incident will cause exactly five 
hours of productivity loss per employee in an organization, nor can it be stated 
with a large amount of certainty that a class V attack will not happen every year. 
This is especially true given the targeting propensity that state sponsored 
hackers show toward DoD agencies. 
Despite the limitations of these models, they still show the potential cost 
savings and risk mitigation that a SIEM solution can provide. Additionally, even 
the most conservative estimates still show a large amount of risk and cost 
avoidance. However, the current study is limited by the amount of data 
comprising the specifics of observed cyber incidents against DoD agencies. If 
given enough access to historical data of cyber security incidents at DoD 
agencies, or even the ability to observe actual rates of occurrence of lesser 
classes of cyber attacks, the information presented in the models could prove 
more accurate in determining the potential return on investment of a SIEM 
solution in a DoD environment. 
2. Future Study 
The potential for future research in the field of advanced security 
intelligence on DoD networks is growing at a nearly exponential rate. With the 
nearly exponential increase in cyber security incidents over the last decade and 
the realization that agencies are under the threat of state supported cyber 
threats, the need for advanced detective and predictive capabilities offered by 
SIEM applications cannot be understated. If given the opportunity and the 
finances, the application of a SIEM application in a DoD environment as an 
experiment could have reaching affects with respect to the understanding of 
exactly what risks DoD information systems are exposed. Effectively, the 
observation of an experimental SIEM system in a DoD environment has the 
potential to justify the investment in the technology, if only for the network 
knowledge it will provide. 
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C. POTENTIAL BENEFITS 
1. Advanced Security Intelligence 
The evolution of cyber threats represents a nearly exponential growth in 
the amount of risk endured by most networks. Advanced threats have the ability 
to selectively bypass security measures and go undetected for an indeterminate 
amount of time, and in some cases years. Employing point security devices to 
counter these threats fails to consider the malicious insider, or the likelihood that 
an attacker can bypass these devices, and implementing a single device to 
counter a specific threat is not economically justifiable. 
Implementation of an advanced security intelligence system, like a SIEM 
application, is one of the few means available to effectively thwart advanced 
cyber threats. The systems offer incredible security capabilities, leverage the 
inherent value of existing investments, and provide significant knowledge of the 
host network. The return that a SIEM system provides leverages all three of 
these aspects, providing a sophisticated security system adept at countering 
sophisticated threats. 
2. Functional Value 
The most apparent value that a SIEM solution provides to a network 
environment is the ability to directly observe the actual risk that the network is 
exposed to, rather than the perceived risks. There are too many surveys and 
studies in existence that reveal the assumption of adequate IT security amongst 
civilian organizations and DoD agencies. Without the ability to monitor the 
network in real time, and the ability to detect sophisticated threats before they 
become stubbornly lodged in sensitive information systems, placing the 
information security in the hands of perimeter devices or IDS/IPS systems is 
foolhardy. Effectively, this methodology is akin to assuming that a security guard 
has the ability to deter any available threat through his own perception of events, 
without the aid of surveillance or additional assistance. Understanding the true 
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risk that computer networks are exposed to is essential to deterring the advanced 
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